accountability and control are guaranteed in all legal systems, albeit by different means 8 -is a typically functionalist argument from functional equivalents.
In short, "the functional method" is a trifold misnomer: There is not one ("the") functional method but many, not all methods so called are functional at all, and some projects claiming adherence to it do not even follow any recognizable method. So does functionalist comparative law actually mean anything? There are some common elements on which functionalist
Comparatists agree. First, functional comparative focuses not on rules but on their effects, not doctrinal structures and arguments, but events. As a consequence, its objects are often judicial decisions as reactions to real life situations, and legal systems are compared with regard to their answers to similar situations. Insofar, functionalist comparative law resembles the so-called case method or factual method, 9 and this method is indeed often referred to as functionalist. But while the factual method looks merely at events and has little to say about their meanings, functionalist comparative law combines its factual approach with the theory that these facts must be understood in the light of their functional relation to society. This theoretical background is the second important element of functionalist comparative law. Law and society are thus thought to be separable but connected. Consequently, and this is the third element, function serves as yardstick for comparison, as tertium comparationis. Institutions, both legal and non-legal, even doctrinally different ones, are comparable if they are functionally equivalent, if they fulfill similar functions in different legal systems. A fourth element, not shared by everyone, is that functionality can serve as an evaluative criterion. Functionalist comparative law then becomes "better law comparison" -the better of several laws is that which fulfills its function better than the others.
In order to evaluate this method we first need to reconstruct it. I will therefore first place the functional method in a historical and interdisciplinary context, in order to see its connections with, and peculiarities opposed to, the debates about functionalism in other disciplines. Second, I
will try to use the functionalist method on the method itself, in order to determine how functional it is. This makes it necessary to place functionalism within a larger framework -not within the development of comparative law, but instead within the rise and fall of functionalism in other disciplines, especially the social sciences. It is of course a risk for a comparative lawyer to use disciplines foreign to his own -sociology, anthropology, philosophy -as lens on his own discipline. The risk may be justified with respect to the insight from comparative law that looking through the eyes of the foreign law enables us better to understand ourselves. Such a connection yields three promises. First, the interdisciplinary look should enable us to (re-) construct a more theoretically grounded functional theory of comparative law than is usually presented. Second, it should help us formulate and evaluate critique of this concept. As comparative law can borrow from the development of functional methods in the social sciences, so it can borrow from the development of critique. However, comparative law is not a social science, and here lies the third promise of an interdisciplinary approach: The comparison with functionalism in other disciplines may enable us to see what is special about functionalism in comparative law, and why what would in other disciplines rightly be regarded as methodological shortcomings may in fact be fruitful for comparative law.
II. Concepts of Functionalism
In 1971, Konrad Zweigert postulated a methodological monopoly: "The basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality." 10 Twelve years before him, Kingsley
David had done something for sociology and anthropology when he had called structuralfunctional analysis "synonymous with sociological analysis." 11 Similarly again, for legal doctrine and theory Laura Kalman quips that the notion of the statement that "we are all realists now" as a truism has itself become a truism.
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Such claims of monopoly suggest lack of conceptual clarity or lack of theoretical sophistication or both. If functionalism is the only method in a discipline, chances are that either the discipline does not recognize all of its potential, or the notion of functional method is blown up to cover so much that it becomes a meaningless concept. Indeed, neither Davis nor Kalman thought that a specified version of functionalism had won the day in their respective disciplines. Davis proposed 10 Zweigert, Kötz (n. 2) 34. Yale, 1927 Yale, -1960 Yale, (1986 , 229. See also Lawrence Rosen, 'Beyond Compare', in Legrand, Munday (n. 5) 493, 504, ending his critique of functionalism by proclaiming: "In some sense, of course, we are all functionalists and that is all to the good inasmuch as it leads us to see connections we might not otherwise have thought obtained."
to drop the notion of functionalism because it blurred the underlying methodological differences. 13 Similarly, the "we are all realists" quote has been used as a strategy to conceal the special contributions of legal realism 14 rather than to adopt their general ones, a way of beating realism by embracing it to death. If we are all functionalists as Zweigert proclaims, then functionalism cannot mean very much -but neither, as one tends to overlook, can its rejection by its critics. This is true for the debate in comparative law even more than for that in other disciplines.
Once we try to reconstruct a more specific concept of functionalism in each discipline, we reach another, less obvious but more important problem. Superficially, one may think that functionalism is, broadly the same in different disciplines. After all, the turn in the 19 th and 20 th century away from essentialist to functionalist methods, from observation of objects themselves to observation of their relations amongst each other and to the whole, was so widespread that one could well speak, in parallel to the famous linguist turn, of a general "functionalist turn" away from essentialism in all academic disciplines (and beyond, for example in architecture). 15 There may indeed be no more fashionable concept in the 20 th century than that of function. 16 The story of the simultaneous rise and fall of functionalism in different disciplines suggests a similar, perhaps even a common, development, or evolution, of ideas. 17 Similarity becomes more plausible once we realize that the development of functionalism was not only parallel, but was based on cross-fertilizations between disciplines: 18 Ernst Cassirer transposed the notion from overlook the differences between concepts and disciplines and, as a consequence, the differences between different kinds of functionalism. This is especially problematic for a discipline like comparative law that sees its place somewhere between the social sciences on the one hand and legal studies on the other, and draws methodological inspiration from both. If the concepts and methods in these disciplines are different, the result can only be methodological mishmash.
In fact, one can distinguish five different concepts of functionalism: neo-Aristotelian functionalism based on inherent teleology (1), evolutionary functionalism in a Darwinian tradition(2), structural functionalism related to Durkheimian sociology (3), neo-Kantian functionalism emphasizing a relational epistemology (4), and equivalence functionalism, building on these concepts but emphasizing the nonteleological, noncausal aspect of functional relations (5). Functionalist comparative law uses all of them, oblivious of incompatibilities (6).
Neo-Aristotelian Functionalism
Obviously, the idea that law performs some function for society in an unspecific sense is old. In one way it can be found in Aristotle, for whom the purpose of things, their telos or causa finalis, was part of their nature. Underlying this was a teleological image of the world, in which everything strived towards perfection. Is and ought were connected, the correct laws could be deduced from the nature of things. Such thoughts were later rejected both in philosophy and in legal theory, but the crisis of legal positivism spurred a simultaneous return to natural law and comparative law, and Aristotelian ideals, in the twentieth century. Once it could be shown that not only problems but also their solutions were similar, a return to a minimal version of natural law or at least ius gentium, based on the Aristotelian notion of function, seemed possible. To this end, the revived rhetorical tradition of topics could be made fruitful. 20 Since then, the function of a thing (or a law) has been separated not only from the reasons for its origin and evolution, 26 but also from its essence; functional relations were separate from the things themselves. Esser's and Gordley's functionalism must be understood against the background of Aristotelian ontology and metaphysics, and the weaknesses of the Aristotelian tradition cause problems for their functionalism as well.
Evolutionary Functionalism
The Aristotelian worldview was rocked by Darwinism, but Darwinism did not discard teleology altogether. 27 While individuals now fought for their own interests rather than for their own nature, they nevertheless still contributed to the progress of the whole. Several elements of Durkheim's functionalism reappear in functionalist comparative law: the scientific character and objectivity of research, the regard to society as a whole that transcends the sum of its parts because its elements are interrelated, the idea that societies have needs, the idea that law can be understood with regard to the needs it fulfills, a focus on observable facts rather than individual ideas (law in action versus law in the books), and, in particular, the finding of similarity between the institutions of different societies. But although Durkheim himself was a trained lawyer, his theory had relatively little direct impact on functionalism in comparative law. 
Neo-Kantian Functionalism
Having lost an Aristotelian foundation, functionalism required another philosophical basis. problems. This ideal law could not be deduced from the insights of comparative law (that would have been an is/ought crossover), but could help psychologically in the quest for better law.
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Twenty years later Max Salomon expanded on these thoughts and formulated the credo of modern functionalist comparative law: Legal science as science deals with universals, but these universals are not legal norms but rather legal problems. As a consequence, comparison between legal norms is only possible between norms responding to the same legal problems. y, in which the variable x defines all α, the variable y defines all β, and all these elements stand in a functional regularity so it is possible to create new elements of the series. This move has two decisive advantages. First, it is not necessary to recognize some essence of a particular element; it is sufficient to understand the element as variable result of a functional connection with a variable other element. Second, it is possible to conceive of groups of elements and to describe them easily, without the loss of specificity that comes with traditional classifications. 73 The function a x y describes all elements of the series completely, whereas a focus on the common element a as classificatory criterion would ignore the specific functional relation between a and y that creates the respective elements. German law (α 2 ) response (β 2 ) to the same problem a, and so on. At the same time, this approach enables the comparatist to focus not only on the similarity between the elements (the common problem a), but also on the differences (between α 1 and α 2 , and between β 1 and β 2 respectively), and furthermore allows her to explain these differences between institutions as a function (!) of the differences between legal systems While such a formalization raises many problems (not the smallest being the question of regularity in the social sciences, as opposed to mathematics and the natural sciences), it seems to be a promising step towards more rational comparative law.
Equivalence Functionalism
Aristotelianism, evolutionary functionalism and structural functionalism all contain traces of determinism and teleology. If similar problems cause similar solutions, then the solutions must somehow be inherent to the problems. Indeed, while sociological functionalists long emphasized functional similarities between societies, they thought that the same functions were fulfilled by the same kinds of institutions. Zweigert, Kötz (n. 2) 3 (referencing Lambert). 94 Zweigert, Kötz (n. 2) 8: "… if the comparatist is to make sense of the rules and the problems they are intended to solve he must often investigate their history." 95 Zweigert, Kötz (n. 2) 33, see also 34 ("feeling"), 35 ("imagination"). 
III. Functions of Function
One could be excused for thinking that functionalist comparative law cannot be defended. After all, we have seen that the functional method is an undertheorized approach with an undefined disciplinary position, assembling bits and pieces from various different traditions, which, though mutually incompatible, have nearly all failed in their own disciplines. But this would be hasty.
Given how unclear the substance of a functional method in comparative law is, we should move from a substantive to a functional analysis and look at what it does, instead of what it is. In the spirit of Durkheim and Merton we should measure the method neither by its origins nor by the intentions of participants in the academic community but by its functionality. We should look at the functions of the concept of function, including its latent functions, in the production of comparative law knowledge. We should look at whether it is functional or dysfunctional, and we should look whether alternative proposals could serve as functional equivalents. This should enable us at the same time to start reconstructing the functional method as an interpretive enterprise instead of a science, 102 as a way of making sense of legal systems by constructing them as meaningful, instead of merely measuring them, and thereby -perhaps -integrate cultural considerations. Of course, such a method must use the same concept of functionalism throughout.
I propose to use equivalence functionalism, both because it is the most robust concept in sociology, and because it represents the central element of functionalist comparative law as developed by Rabel and Zweigert.
Of several functions we could distinguish, this section focuses on seven: the epistemological function understanding legal rules and institution (1), the comparative function of achieving comparability (2), the presumptive function of emphasizing similarity (3), the formalizing function of system building (4), the evaluative function of determining the better law (5), the universalizing function of preparing legal unification (6), and finally the critical function of providing tools for the critique of law (7). 
The Epistemological Function: Understanding law
The first function of function is epistemological. Functionalism provides a tool to make sense of the data we find. We understand this function of function if we distinguish functionalist comparative law from an approach that shares some of its methodology and is often referred to as functionalist: the factual method as applied in common core research. 103 There are two important differences which strip the factual method of much of the explanatory power that functionalism claims for itself, and which suggest that the factual method and common core research should not be called functionalist. 104 First, the factual method shows us similarities across legal systems, but it does not tell us whether these are accidental or necessary, or how they relate to society. Second, the case method, in its focus on cases, is limited in its view in two ways: its problems are only disputes; its solutions are only court decisions. Functionalism in turn promises more. It aims at explaining the effects of legal institutions as functions (a specific kind of relation), and it promises to look at non-legal responses to societal requisites, too. The functional method asks us to understand legal institutions not as doctrinal constructs but as societal responses to problems, not as isolated instances but in their relation to the whole legal system and beyond to the whole of society.
Obviously functionalism is not and cannot be the only available epistemological scheme for understanding a legal system. 105 It deliberately chooses an observer's perspective as an alternative to, not a substitute for, the participant's perspective chosen by cultural approaches, and emphasizes the view of law in a specific relation (namely functional relation), acknowledging other relations. Of course this means that functionalism cannot claim to capture some essence of legal institutions. 106 But such a claim would run counter to its own program anyway. We have seen that functionalism is the fruit of a move, in sociology like in philosophy, away from metaphysical concepts like "substance" and "essence". Cf. Graziadei (n. 5) 112: "The attempt to reduce the legal meaning of any fact to the legal effects of that fact as stated in operative terms is probably flawed inasmuch as it pretends to capture some ultimate truth".
At the same time, the frequent criticism that functionalism is reductive or has no view for culture is somewhat misplaced. It was the great advantage of functionalism over substantivism, emphasized first by Cassirer, that it enabled generalizations without loss of specificity. 107 The functional analysis emphasizes relations in addition to institutions, and it focuses on latent in addition to manifest functions. In this sense, a functionalist view of legal institutions, focusing on the complex interrelatedness of societies, leads to a picture that is not less but more complex than that of the participant in a legal system. What critics call reductionist is the functionalists' resistance to adopt an insider's view, their unwillingness to approve of culture simply because it is culture, and of course its reconstruction of culture as functional (or dysfunctional) relations. This can only account for one aspect of culture. But once we give up the hope to grasp any "essence" of culture, a functionalist outsider's account need not be inferior to a culturalist insider's account, it just highlights a different aspect.
Of course, such a functionalist comparative law, driven by a particular interest of the comparatist, cannot be fully objective and neutral, and functionalism's claim to neutrality is problematic. concept. For evolutionists a problem is a situation in society that spurs legal and ultimately social change; the solution is only a temporary step forward that will lead to new problems. For neoKantians a problem is a legal problem ("Rechtsproblem") and thus a problem defined by the law not by social reality, an aprioristic philosophical concept. 113 As a consequence, the solution cannot be found in an analogy to the sciences because it requires a value judgment. 114 For structural functionalists finally a problem is one side of a bipolar functional relation, the other side taken by the institution that meets the need, so society can stay in equilibrium.
Moreover, when sociologists and anthropologists defined substantive problems, they often fall These are real problems with functionalism as a social science, but somewhat less for comparative law. The sociological attempt to determine the functions of legal institutions as real facts is difficult (although, as we will see in a moment, comparison helps in this regard). But functionalism can be understood as a constructive approach. By explaining legal institutions functionally, we produce hypotheses not only about the existence of problems and the structure of a society as realities (either empirical or philosophical), but also make proposals about how societies can and should be understood, not just how they work. We need not "prove" that a problem "exists" and an institution is a "response" to it, we need to make this connection plausible as a way of understanding. We may well say that problems are "constructed" 118 scientific to an interpretative approach to law, a way of "making sense" that is distinct from the participants' way of making sense of their legal systems. This would be problematic for a science, but for an argumentative discipline like law it seems to be an important function of functionalism. And it seems plausible to interpret law which is after all a more normative, purpose-oriented activity than some activities, in such a way. construction of universal problems as tertia comparationis. This is where the notion of functional equivalent gets its capture. Even if we understand legal institutions as responses to societal needs we need not ignore that they are not caused by these needs in the sense of logical necessity; rather, they are contingent responses to these needs that can be identified with reference to the other possible responses, the functional equivalents, that were not chosen. 127 We may not know these functional equivalents until we see them in other legal systems, but seeing them enables us to isolate the underlying problem and thereby recognize the functions of a legal institution. The similarity of results to certain fact situations, regardless of differences in doctrine, strongly suggests that the respective legal institutions can be seen as different (but functionally equivalent) responses to a similar problem which, in turn, can then be assumed as universal. This reasoning is of course circular -we go from problems to functions and from functions to problems. This would be problematic in comparative law as science; in comparative law as interpretation it enacts a hermeneutical circle. similarity and difference or should even openly advocate difference over similarity. 132 Third, the postulate is reductionist: similarity will only appear once legal orders, or institutions, are stripped of culturally relevant and contingent details 133 . Some defendants of functionalism give in to the critique and give up the presumption of similarity; they admit that the presumption is problematic and proclaim a functionalism in comparative law that is indifferent between similarity and difference. 134 But things are not this easy.
The Comparative Function: function as tertium comparationis
First one should put the presumption in its historical context. When it was formulated it served to counter the presumption of difference prevailing among ordinary lawyers, and of course between countries that had just gone to war on the basis of essentialized differences. 135 In this sense, the presumption of similarity was as critical of the current state of affairs as the more recent emphasis on difference, which may likewise be just a rhetorical strategy against the presumption of similarity. 136 Calls for "falsification" of the presumption are then as misplaced as calls for a switch to a praesumptio dissimilitudinis because they only shift the rhetoric.
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More to the point however, the presumption is indeed closely linked to the methodological assumptions. Recall that functionalist comparative law assumes universality of problems. If problems are universal, then every society must respond to these problems in some way. A society that has no response to a problem would be evidence that the problem is not universal. In this sense the presumption is not just Zweigert's naïve idea, but rather a necessary element of functionalist comparative law. Here the caveat that only societies at similar stages and institutions in value-neutral areas of the law can be compared becomes important. Of course it turns the assumption into a tautology: problems are universal insofar as we exclude all problems that are not universal. This tautology would be fatal for a functionalist theory, but it becomes helpful for an interpretative functional method again, because it describes a thought process between the general and the specific that creates knowledge. The claim of universality of a problem is a first 132 E.g. Curran (n. 58); Legrand (n. 62); cf. Hyland (n. 120) 194: "coniectura dissimilitudinis". interpretative step that can be challenged, but that, again, is a way of making sense of one legal system in relation to another.
Given that the presumption is central to the functional method, it becomes vital to understand clearly what the presumption does and does not say. Unfortunately, Zweigert's own formulation of "similarity" is misleading. What is presumed to be similar are not the legal institutions but the problems to be solved by them and the need for societies to respond to them. Even if we assume the universality of at least some problems, and if we can do away with rhetorical and strategic arguments discussed before, we cannot possibly claim that different solutions to similar problems, the core element of the functional method, are really "similar". Nobody could seriously say that for example tort law and insurance law are similar just because they fulfill the same function of providing accident victims with compensation for their accidents. Tort law and insurance law are obviously different not only in their doctrinal structures but also, a point often neglected by comparatists, in their effects and functions (and dysfunctions) regarding other functional requirements than that of compensation like, for example, deterrence, creation of certain kinds of jobs (judges or insurers), litigiousness or welfare mentality in society, etc. In other words, they are similar only with regard to exactly one element, namely the solution of one specific problem. This is not normally called similarity, this is called functional equivalence.
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If critics consider the praesumptio similitudinis internally inconsistent, because comparatists claim that different legal systems find similar results although at the same time they advocate differences between the legal institutions they compare, 139 they are right. Comparatists do indeed look at difference and similarity at the same time, but that is not inconsistency. Rather, functional equivalence is similarity in difference, it is the finding that institutions are similar in one regard (namely in one of the functions they fulfill) while they are (or at least may be) different in all other regards -their doctrinal formulations, but also the other functions or dysfunctions they may have besides the one on which the comparatist focuses. The decision to look at a certain problem, and therefore at a certain function, becomes crucial therefore for the findings of similarity or difference, but this is always similarity only with regard to the one function. The finding of similarity is contingent on the comparatist's focus. 138 Cf. Scheiwe (n. 119) 35.
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Jonathan Hill (n. 61) 103, 109. Cf. Frankenberg (n. 32) 440: "How solutions can be "cut loose" from their context and at the same time be related to their environment, how law can be "seen purely" as function satisfying a "particular" need, escapes me. It seems to require two contradictory operations: first, suppressing the context and considering it; and then moving from the general (function) to the specific without knowing what makes the specific specific."
To assume that this degree of similarity explains the whole institution would be a gross misunderstanding for two reasons. First, the choice of one institution comes with the exclusion of other functionally equivalent institutions. The choice of tort law for compensation purposes is, at least in part, a choice against insurance law for the same purposes. It would therefore obviously be wrong to say that "really" both are the same, because this would strip a legal system of its uniqueness. Second, when the comparatist uses one function as his tertium comparationis, he deliberately leaves other functions out of his view, with regard to which institutions may well be different. 140 Insofar as functional equivalence means similarity with regard to one function, the presumption is tautological: 141 because only institutions fulfilling the same function are comparable, by definition they must be similar with regard to their quality of fulfilling this function. Nothing is said about any further similarity or difference. The point is so poorly understood in the current debate that it may deserve to be repeated: Functionality leads to comparability of institutions that can thereby maintain their difference even in the comparison. It neither presumes nor leads to similarity.
The Formalizing Function: building a system
Functional comparatists themselves blur this insight. Zweigert announces, as last step in the comparative method, the "building of a system" with its own "special syntax and vocabulary".
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In a way this is at the same time the most interesting and the most problematic function of function. It finds parallels both in sociology and anthropology, where for example RadcliffeBrown hoped that function could lead to a general heuristic of societies and societal systems, and in legal philosophy, where comparative law is linked to the system-building project of general jurisprudence. 143 In both these disciplines the projects have rightly been criticized. General law. 144 After dismissing doctrine and replacing it with function, this step requires the comparatist now to retranslate these functions into doctrinal terms 145 and even a system. 146 After destructing all doctrinal systems, the comparatist is asked to build a new one. Must not such a system be as formalist and as doctrinal as the national systems that the functional methods try to overcome? "Comparative law is by its nature a functional and antidoctrinal method.", says Zweigert. 147 Can it be formalist at the same time? 148 The problem is, as so often, that formalist/antiformalist is a very unclear dichotomy. We can distinguish three versions of the formalism critique against functional comparative law, and consequently develop three kinds of response. The first version of the criticism -functionalism is too rule-centered 149 -is appropriate for many studies that call themselves functional, but less for the theoretical approach of comparative law. Functionalists explicitly ask that Comparatists look not only at legal rules ("law in books"), not even only at legal rules as applied ("law in action"),
but beyond this at non-legal answers to societal needs 150 . Few Comparatists may practice this, but this is not inherent to the method. The broader problem, whether "law" can be separated from "society", 151 cannot be discussed here in full. Suffice it to point out that the idea of "law as a semiautonomous field" of study is not a peculiarity of (comparative) lawyers, and that using "law" as starting point for comparative studies does not necessarily entail a claim of independence from society.
The second version of the criticism is related to the first but has more force. Any system that functional comparatists try to build must, whether it is a system of law or of "meta-law", necessarily be formalist to some degree, because systems always are. Functionalism may not require us to build a legal system, but is functionalism possible without building any system? A Functionalism cannot counter this criticism. On the one hand, if the system to be built is itself a legal system it falls prey to the critique, just as the legal realists' attempts to build more functional rules could not counter the attack of reintroducing formalism. On the other hand,
Zweigert is certainly right that we cannot easily dispense of a syntax and a system outside our objects of analysis in order to analyze them critically. But is this a problem? It is submitted that this formalizing project is problematic only as long as we ascribe some essentialist character to the system we build. The problem would be the attempt to define this syntax as somehow more "real" than the doctrinal constructions of national legal systems, to see this system as the "true" system of law underlying the formulations in individual systems. Indeed functionalist comparatists come close to such a position when they seek universal truths behind the contingent solutions of different legal systems and thereby fall back on a natural law functionalism. We have learned from the failure of legal realism to create a theory of values that there is no "true" functional system behind the "merely formal" doctrinal constructions of national legal rules. But we can safely construct, and propose, functional systems, even formulated in legal terminology, as interpretative lenses on existing legal systems, and ultimately as critique of these legal systems. Any such system will be open to criticism like any other system, but each of them may provide new angles on the legal systems we compare, and help us both understand and critique them.
The Evaluative Function: determining the better law
While the construction of a system is thus an implicitly normative-critical project, functionalist comparative law sometimes asserts an explicitly normative function: Function should serve as yardstick to determine the "better law". This step from facts to norms is problematic. Saleilles proposed to look to the majority solution of legal orders to find a (functionally defined) "droit idéal relatif", 152 but why should majority suggest superiority? 153 The common core projects, the Zweigert himself was aware that the empirical material collected by the comparatist did not have legal authority 157 , that normative analysis is exclusively the (comparative) lawyer's task. The sociologist is not only unable to help but will even frown at the comparative lawyer's methods.
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But to the extent that comparative law studies finds similarity in result between different legal orders (and this is, for Zweigert, almost always the case), all that needs to be evaluated is the better doctrinal formulation, and this is a task that the jurist is both able and entitled to do 159 .
Others are even more ambitious -they ask which rule actually serves its function better. 160 But there is a problem here: After a certain function has been used to determine relative similarity, now the same function must use to assess superiority, which assumes difference -again with regard to this function. This is impossible. The question was whether a solicitor, who had negligently failed to finalize a will, was responsible to the intended beneficiaries. The court started by assessing several functions of liability: Tort-feasors should not go "scot-free", solicitors should maintain a high standard, legacies played an important role in society etc. Then the court compared various functionally equivalent foreign doctrinal constructions for this result as to their adequacy within English law.
However, while these foreign solutions were comparable because they were responses to the same problem (functionalism), the second step, assessing whether these solutions could be adopted in English law, was a matter of doctrinal fit. Functionalism could play no role in this.
This does not mean that evaluation of the results of functionalist comparison is impossible, but it suggests that the criteria of evaluation must be different from the criteria of comparability.
Functional comparison may have given us a new view of the legal systems, but cannot help us evaluate them. Moreover, any evaluation is contingent on the function which formed the focus of the comparative inquiry. One law is not better than the other tout court, but at best with regard to a certain function. Ultimately, evaluation remains a policy decision under conditions of partial uncertainty. The functional method can show alternatives and provide some information, but it cannot substitute this policy decision.
The Universalizing Function: Unifying law
Evaluation is closely linked to another function of function that may have been primordial in the beginning: to be a tool for the unification of law. Functionalist Comparatists advocate their method as an ideal tool for the unification of law, whether regionally (for example in Europe), or worldwide. The argument for the functional method rests on two alleged qualities: first, its ability to reveal which of different laws is the best, regardless of doctrinal constructions, and second, its ability to guide the process of writing an optimal uniform law that overcomes and transcends the doctrinal peculiarities of local legal systems. Once we realize that different laws are really functionally similar, so the argument goes, it becomes easier to unify them on the basis of these findings.
We have already seen two problems with this argument. First, the functional method, properly understood, cannot reveal which of several legal systems is better than the others (III.5). Second, the antiformalist functional method is not a good tool for the formulation of legal rules that must necessarily, as rules, be formalist (III.4.). It deliberate ignores the experiences that legal systems have made with legal doctrine and the creation of systems, experiences that will be necessary for the building of a new doctrine and a new system. 163 Functionalist comparative law works well for the critique of doctrine, far less well for its establishment.
Yet there is an additional, slightly less obvious reason why functionalist comparative law is a particularly bad tool for the unification of law. As we have seen, functionalism with its emphasis on functional equivalence preserves difference within similarity; different institutions are formally different but functionally equivalent. This means that benefits from unification are likely to be meager, because they concern only form, not substance (or, more specifically, functionality). They may well be outweighed by the costs. Not only is it costly for lawyers to learn about new forms. Moreover, the functional method assumes that each legal institution performs a variety of functions within its legal system, and that there is a sensitive interaction between the various institutions in each system that accounts for intersystemic differences. Partial unification of law is then likely to unsettle this balance, a problem we see in the difficult coordination between the UN Sales Convention and national legal systems. 164 This may explain why practitioners and business in Europe reacted with some reserve to proposals for a unified contract law -from a functional perspective (which, presumably, is that of the practice) its costs may well outweigh its benefits. The functional method shows why unification may be easier than one may think, but also why it is less important.
Of course interrelatedness can also provide and argument in favor of unification. law of succession, the other through family law; one legal system protects poor parties through the law of damages, the other through the law of procedure. This can lead to consistencies if, under a choice of law analysis, different laws are applicable for different areas. Most of these problems however can be countered through a functionalist approach in choice of law 165 .
Remaining problems that provide an argument for legal unification are not so frequent.
So we see with some surprise that the functional method is not only a bad tool for legal unification but even provides powerful arguments for maintaining differences. Indeed, alternatives to unification are often based on a preference for functional equivalence over Islamic divorce based on unilateral repudiation, because they find repudiation functionally equivalent to divorce in Western democracies which can also, effectively, be brought about 168 against or without the will of one of the spouses. In all of these cases, the tolerance for foreign law is brought about only by the recognition of functional equivalence.
At the same time, functionalist comparison can help us critique foreign law, especially where a legal system insists on its cultural autonomy. Invoking culture is a popular tool of critical strands in comparative law, for the sake of plurality and autonomy. But given that culture is sometimes invented and sometimes undesirable, one may well ask how we can differentiate between "true"
("good"?) culture worth preserving, and "false" ("bad"?) culture invoked for undesirable purposes. This is difficult for an insider who may lack a critical perspective, and for an outsider who may lack sufficient insight. Functionalist comparative law can here be helpful in building the ground for critique. The reason is that functionalist comparison combines two important perspectives: awareness of culture on the one hand, an outside perspective on the other. By reconstructing legal culture in functional terms it helps preserve the culture's otherness while at the same time making it commensurable with our own law -we see what the foreign law's functions and dysfunctions are, both manifest and latent, and we know from comparison how else these effects can be brought about. This is all the method does, it does not provide us with the tools to critique the foreign law. But without the groundwork laid, such critique is hard to formulate.
On the other hand, functionalist comparative law helps less in the critique our own law. The reason is again functional equivalence: Because we cannot say whether a foreign law is better than our own, recognizing different solutions abroad does not show us deficiencies at home.
Functionalist comparison can open our eyes for alternative solutions, but it cannot tell us whether those alternative solutions are better or not. Functionalism can provide us with a view from outside on our own law, but whether what we see thus can be critiqued remains for other methods to be determined. Functionalism can be critical of doctrinalism by showing us the contingency of our doctrines, but it cannot shows us a way towards law without doctrine, and it cannot provide such law.
Finally, functionalism is indeed uncritical in various respects, in which we may wish for critique.
First, functionalism does not help us in critiquing functionality and purposes. 172 Quite to the contrary, in showing that other societies pursue the same goals by different means, it may reinforce our conviction that certain purposes are somehow necessary. Second, functionalism does not help us much in a fundamental critique of law. Functionalism may show that other societies fulfill certain needs with other institutions than law, but it cannot provide alternatives to the functionalist thinking which is inherent to our thinking about law. Third, functionalist comparative law avoids governance and may therefore be considered inherently conservative. 173 ;
its deliberate political neutrality is of little help for projects of understanding and critiquing globalization. Fourth, because functionalist comparative law presumes separate societies and separate legal systems as objects of comparison, it is unable to conceptualize the way in which these systems, and these societies, are interdependent, a growing problem under conditions of globalization. Fifth, functionalist comparison is unable to account for tension within legal systems, tensions, at least as long as it focuses on legal systems as interrelated, not on subsystems.
All of these are real shortcomings, not only of the functional method in comparative law but of traditional comparative law at large. In this way, those who critique the functional method while what they aim at is mainstream comparative law as a whole, are partly right: insofar functionalism stands for mainstream comparative law. It remains to be seen, however, whether the critics can come up with methods that are as powerful as the functional method, even with regard to critical potential. The comparative law that would be necessary for these tasks might have to be more radical than the projects of critics as well.
IV. Towards Interpretative Functionalism in Comparative Law?
Part III has left us with some surprising results. Generally, one assumes that the strength of the functional method lies in its emphasis on similarities, its aspirations towards evaluation and unification of law. This is the main reason why supporters since Rabel have seen in it such a powerful tool, and why opponents have felt the need to combat it so fiercely. We have seen that supporters and opponents are both wrong: The functional method emphasizes difference, it does not give us criteria for evaluation, and it provides powerful arguments against unification. us to look at culture, but also enables us, better than other methods, to formulate general laws without having to abstract from the specificities.
Part II shows us why these misunderstandings exist. The problem is that the functional method, as generally described, combines a number of different concepts of function: an evolutionary concept, a structural concept, a concept focusing on equivalence. The relation between these different concepts within the method is unclear, its aspirations therefore unrealistic. If we reconstruct the method plainly on the basis of functional equivalence as the most robust of the three concepts of function and emphasize an interpretative as opposed to a scientific approach, we realize that the functional method can make less claims, but at the same time is less open to some of the critique voiced against it. In short, the functional method is strong as a tool for understanding, comparing, and critiquing different laws, but a weak tool for evaluating and unifying laws. It helps us in tolerating and critiqueing foreign law, it helps us less in critiquing our own.
All of this suggests that the intensive methodological debates in sociology cannot simply be transposed because there are important differences between sociological and legal functionalism.
We can see this in the different reactions. Indeed, reactions in both disciplines are different. that sociologists take an external, lawyers take an internal point of view.
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Yet this difference is linked to another difference, that between the goals of functionalism in both disciplines. Only partly is this the difference between normative and descriptive-analytical goals (after all, a large part of the judge's task is descriptive, too). 177 Rather, sociologists use functionalism in order to raise complexity, so their picture of observed societal systems becomes more accurate than a mere listing of its elements. Lawyers on the other hand need functionalism in order to reduce complexity -they hope for functionality to tell them which of several alternative decisions they should take. 178 The effects of their decisions are only partly the responsibility of judges, 179 and even legislators must make decisions in necessary partial ignorance of effects.
Finally, a third difference is important. Sociologists and legal philosophers often focus on the differentiated functions of relatively broadly defined institutions, while comparative lawyers on the other hand take the existence and functionality of law for granted and focus on very specific legal issues. Of course, legislators may learn about latent functions over time. Sunset clauses for legislation are a response to the problem: lawmakers make laws, then observe their latent functions and dysfunctions, and then react to this learning experience.
176 failed, and the interaction between sociology and comparative law has focused more on empirical sociology than on theory.
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This may suggest why functionalism in comparative law is stronger than in other disciplines.
First, it may be true that other disciplines discarded functionalism, but only after they had utilized the insights from functionalism. Functionalist comparative law has by far not yet achieved its potential. This study could only hint at the possibilities. But it should already have suggested that a more methodologically aware functionalism will provide us with better insights into the functioning of law, and can be more useful insights than other current approaches. Second, functionalism in comparative law, understood as a legal discipline, may well be immune against some of the critique voiced against functionalism in the social sciences. It is important to recall that law is a normative discipline, for which teleology need not be a bad thing, but instead necessary for its own functioning. Of course, what is necessary is the reconstruction of a more robust functional method on these terms. This contribution proposes to base such a method on equivalence functionalism and on an understanding of comparative law as interpretative, not
scientific. Whether such a method, more fully developed, can hold its own -against the uncritical version of functionalism on the one hand, and against the critical alternatives to functionalism on the other -remains to be seen. But it seems well worth the attempt. 
